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From Parameters, Autumn 1999, pp. 24-53.
"So by the benefit of this light of reason, they have found out artillery, by which wars come to a quicker
end than heretofore, and the great expense of blood is avoided; for the numbers slain now, since the
invention of artillery, are much less than before, when the sword was the executioner." -- John Donne,
1621

To a French Foreign Legionnaire reeling under murderous Viet Minh bombardments at the siege of Dien Bien Phu,
John Donne's notion that the advent of artillery would diminish the carnage of war would seem to be the cruelest--and
most preposterous--of ironies.[1] Yet not uncommonly the introduction of new military technology is accompanied by
enthusiastic predictions that the savagery of war will somehow be mitigated. All too often, however, these promises
remain unfulfilled. Consider, for example, the widely held 17th-century belief that the invention of gunpowder made
war "less horrible."[2]
Such is the faith in scientific progress. In truth, technological advances bear great responsibility for the exponential
growth in the sheer destructiveness of war.[3] Furthermore, as the grim statistics of modern conflicts amply
demonstrate, much of that destructiveness falls not just upon belligerent armies and their weaponry, but increasingly
upon noncombatants and their property.[4]
Today we are once again seeing renewed optimism that technology might yet provide relief from the nightmare of war.
Recent scientific developments raise hopes that 21st-century warfare--if not avoided altogether--might nevertheless be
waged in a more humane manner. Much of this optimism is traceable to the Gulf War where the application of high
technology seemed to minimize allied and Iraqi casualties alike. Key to this new perception of war were the widely
televised images of precision-guided munitions (PGMs).[5] The hopes those pictures evoked are exemplified by the
comments of authors George and Meredith Friedman in their book, The Future of War:
The accuracy of PGMs promises to give us a very different age, perhaps a more humane one. It is odd to
speak favorably about the moral character of a weapon, but the image of a Tomahawk missile slamming
precisely into its target when contrasted with the strategic bombardments of World War II does in fact
contain a deep moral message and meaning. War may well be a ubiquitous part of the human condition,
but war's permanence does not necessarily mean that the slaughters of the 20th century are permanent.[6]
To many, PGMs are not the only means of fulfilling the dream of more humane war. The advocates of "information
operations" and cyberwar contend that 21st-century conflicts can be fought virtually bloodlessly in cyberspace.[7] In a
cyberwar scenario depicted in a 1995 Time magazine article, a US Army officer conjured up a future crisis in which a
technician ensconced at a computer terminal in the United States could derail a distant aggressor "without firing a
shot" simply by manipulating computer and communications systems.[8] Likewise, the proponents of a growing
plethora of "nonlethal" technologies argue that a range of adversaries can be engaged without deadly effect.[9]
Collectively, most experts believe these innovations reflect an ongoing "revolution in military affairs" (RMA). The
RMA seeks to produce radically more effective--and, as the Friedmans indicate, more humane--militaries by
profoundly altering their doctrine, organization, and weaponry through the widespread application of emerging
microchip-based technologies, especially advanced computer and communications systems.[10] Many observers

believe that the RMA will give the United States a virtually insurmountable military advantage for the foreseeable
future.[11]
The impetus to seek technological solutions to virtually every human dilemma--even the costly viciousness of war--is
quintessentially American.[12] Yankee ingenuity has long sought to substitute machines for manpower.[13]
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the United States has enthusiastically embraced the RMA; technology has rapidly become
the cornerstone of America's military planning. General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, declared that his 1996 directive, Joint Vision (JV) 2010, furnishes "an operationally based template" for "how
America's armed forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities
to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting."[14]
All of this would seem to bode well for those concerned with the ethical conduct of war. But are new technologies
unqualified virtues? In Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences, author
Edward Tenner reminds us that technological "advances" have the nasty habit of surprising us with unexpected adverse
qualities once their full import is experienced.[15] Well-intentioned efforts can paradoxically create problems worse
than the ones a specific invention was meant to solve. Even generally favorable scientific developments frequently
manifest "revenge effects" which at best "recomplicate" a particular task or situation.
This essay seeks to examine the moral conundrums that 21st-century statesmen and soldiers may face that are
generated or, as Tenner might put it, "recomplicated" by technological advances. Doing so will necessarily involve
assessing the effect of high-tech war on the existing law of armed conflict.[16] The essay contends that there is a direct
relation between ethics and such law. As Geoffrey Best insists, "It must never be forgotten that the law of war,
wherever it began at all, began mainly as a matter of religion and ethics. . . . It began in ethics and it has kept one foot
in ethics ever since."[17] As a result, this essay will try to show where international law, which should reflect at least
minimum standards of ethics and morality, needs reexamination because of the new technologies of war.
Neither ethics nor law, however, can answer all the questions that may arise on 21st-century battlefields. Very often
policy addresses the many gray areas that ethics and law do not necessarily enlighten, let alone resolve. Policy is
critical because even where a particular course of action is technically moral and legal, there remains the important
issue of perceptions. Perceptions can materially affect the public support that military operations conducted by
democracies require. Professors W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou explain:
In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base of public
support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the political
objective, if people believe that the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.[18]
In developing defense policy for the 21st century, leaders must deal with two related aspects of post-Vietnam and
post-Gulf War America. The first is the growing aversion in both the electorate and in the uniformed ranks toward
incurring virtually any friendly casualties in many military operations.[19] The second, which Walter Boyne points out
"is unusual in history," requires wars to be won with "a minimum number of casualties inflicted on the enemy."[20]
The rapid end to the Gulf War after pictures of the so-called "Highway of Death" were televised illustrates the new
ethical and political perceptions that can influence policymakers.
Of course, this essay does not purport to address every, or even most, of the challenges of ethics, law, and policy
produced by high-technology war. Moreover, even where the issues that could recomplicate moral life for 21st-century
statesmen and soldiers are described, solutions are seldom supplied. Rather, if this essay succeeds, it will pose
questions that, in turn, may suggest areas worthy of further study. With this in mind, let us return to PGMs, perhaps the
most ready occasion of the unexpected conundrums of high-tech war.
Precision Guided Munitions
As already indicated, PGMs are considered by many as a key to more humane warfare. JV 2010 touts "precision
engagement" as a means to "lessen risk to [US] forces, and [to] minimize collateral damage."[21] PGMs are thought to
diminish the horror of war not only because they reduce collateral damage, but also because their accuracy decreases
the number of attackers required to go in harm's way to strike a given target.[22] PGMs meet many traditional legal

and moral norms by providing a greatly enhanced capability to limit the application of force to belligerent militaries
and those implements of war whose destruction is mandated by military necessity.[23] In short, unlike other high-tech
armaments (e.g., nuclear weapons) that provide military advantages but political liabilities, PGMs uniquely seem to
offer both military efficiency and an unparalleled opportunity to seize the moral high ground so conducive to
maintaining the necessary public support for military operations.
What then might be the recomplicating effects of their use? One of these is occasioned by the unpredictability of the
enemy response. Among other things, we cannot expect future adversaries to be "grateful" that the United States used
"humane" PGMs against them. The February 1997 issue of Air Force Magazine reports a startling illustration of how
one potential opponent might react:
Many Russian military theorists believe nuclear weapons provide the best answer to the challenge posed
by conventionally armed precision guided munitions, which have become such an important part of
Western military strategies. Russian generals fear that, in a general war, Western nations could employ
such "smart munitions" to degrade Russian strategic forces, without ever having to go nuclear themselves.
Consequently, said General Volkov, Russia "should enjoy the right to consider the first [enemy] use of
precision weapons as the beginning of unrestricted nuclear war against it."[24]
While the risk of nuclear holocaust might be an extreme example of an unintended consequence of PGM use, there are
plenty of more-conventional results of great concern. For example, it has been received wisdom since the Gulf War
that Iraq's firing of Kuwaiti oil fields was a monstrous environmental crime.[25] Yet, as Professor Michael Schmitt
acknowledges, "It could be argued that the fires were intended to take advantage of `weaknesses' in high-tech
Coalition weapons. . . . [S]moke can foil guided munitions. Consider the difficulty, for example, of using an electrooptical guided weapon on a smoke-covered target."[26] As a matter of fact, the fires' smoke did degrade the
effectiveness of PGMs as well as that of coalition intelligence-gathering satellites.[27] Authors Michael R. Gordon and
General Bernard E. Trainor argue that the Iraqis torched the Kuwaiti oil fields to "erase the Americans' high-tech
advantage."[28] Indeed, the Iraqis were able to launch one of their few offensive actions when an armored formation
emerged from the smoke of the burning Burqan oil fields and struck US Marines early in the ground war.[29]
As the Iraqi actions suggest, the use of PGMs might well drive adversaries--especially in less-developed nations--to
employ pernicious methodologies to counteract them. It is possible, therefore, that PGM use in certain instances may
render the war more, not less, destructive. If a belligerent is attacked with high-tech systems against which it lacks the
ability to resist or respond in kind, does it not have the right to respond with whatever resources it has available?[30]
That a country has the resources to develop and deploy high-tech weaponry does not endow it with moral superiority
over economically inferior opponents. Moreover, sheer destructiveness does not make a specific method of warfare
necessarily illegal so long as the requisites of the law of armed conflict are observed.
But it is also evident that when accepted methods of defense against bombardment such as hardening and battlefield
dispersal are circumvented at least to some extent by the deadly accuracy of PGMs, frustrated defenders may resort to
conduct clearly in violation of international norms. One such behavior may have been inspired by an unintended
consequence of the Gulf War use of PGMs to destroy the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad. Unbeknownst to coalition
targeteers, that command and control facility was also being used as a shelter by the families of high Iraqi officials.
The broadcast of pictures of bodies being pulled from the wreckage caused US leaders, concerned about adverse public
reaction to the noncombatant deaths, to virtually end further attacks on the Iraqi capital.[31] Though the decision to
forgo strikes on Baghdad had little effect on the outcome of the war, the precedent is important in the context of
Tenner's "recomplicating" effect thesis. The US response to the unexpected results of the Al Firdos bombing could
suggest to some opponents a reliable (albeit unconscionable) method of defending against PGM attacks: cover the
target with noncombatants.[32] And, indeed, that is reportedly what transpired during NATO's aerial campaign against
Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999--with Yugoslav civilians reportedly "protecting" Belgrade bridges by insulating the
bridges with their bodies.
Such brute behavior creates complications for high-minded US forces. As JV 2010 asserts, "high ethical standards" are
central to the American military ethos.[33] This fact, however, makes our forces vulnerable to tactics that aim to
manipulate their innate respect for human life. In Bosnia, for example, using human shield tactics enabled the Serbs to

discourage PGM strikes by US and other NATO planes by the simple expedient of chaining captured UN troops to
potential targets.[34] Other nations can be similarly affected by the exploitation of noncombatants. During the war in
Chechnya, for example, insurgents offset their technological inferiority by threatening civilian hostages to force the
Russians to meet various demands.[35]
Several potential US adversaries appear prepared to use noncombatants to blunt the power of high-tech weaponry.
Libya threatened to surround the reported site of an underground chemical plant with "millions of Muslims" in order to
ward off attacks.[36] Most recently, when Western military action seemed imminent, Saddam Hussein covered his
palaces and other buildings with noncombatant civilians (some of whom may have genuinely volunteered) in order to
discourage PGM attacks by Western forces sensitive to the effect on their publics of civilian deaths, regardless of the
circumstances.[37]
All of this suggests that PGMs are no panacea. The expectations of decisionmakers that PGM employment will reduce
the dangers to noncombatants may be frustrated; indeed, noncombatants could--paradoxically--be placed at greater
risk by PGM use in some instances. In truth, the inclination of unscrupulous foes who are determined to counter
technologically superior US forces by reviving the age-old strategy of human shields may herald a new era of
barbarism in warfare. In commenting on the actions of Somali warlords who used human shields, James Dunnigan
ominously warns, "If the opponents are bloody-minded enough, they will always exploit the humanitarian attitudes of
their adversaries."[38]
Along these lines, technology itself may provide another recomplicating effect: In order to avoid the effects of PGMs,
new communications technology--which JV 2010 says is already available--will allow an unprecedented level of
dispersal of military forces. Dispersal is a way to reduce PGM efficiency, and one that experts assert is militarily
imperative for those wishing to confront an information-superior opponent like the United States.[39] Dispersal
presents a number of recomplications. Among other things, adversaries can employ inexpensive communications
devices to so disperse their forces (e.g., create "virtual" command posts rather than the fixed nodes which optimize
PGM efficiency) that the United States will be forced to use costly[40] and limited stocks of PGMs against small
targets, many of which will be individually expendable. As yet another form of the human-shield tactic, an enemy can
further complicate targeting by intentionally dispersing into civilian areas.
Another way of avoiding the effects of PGMs is to move into complex terrain, especially jungles, forests, and urban
areas. Laser and electro-optically guided munitions will not track targets through foliage. In urban areas, even the
extreme accuracy of PGMs will not be adequate to prevent civilian casualties. Witness the toll of civilian casualties
produced by unintended airstrikes against a train and bus, the Chinese Embassy, and apparently the Korisa camp
during the NATO air campaign of April-May 1999 in Serbia and Kosovo.[41]
Noncombatants and Civilian Infrastructure
Dispersing combatants and military objects into the civilian community is offensive to international law because it
violates the principle that defenders have an obligation to separate military targets from civilians and their
property.[42] Iraq was rightly criticized for purposely ignoring this tenet during the Gulf War.[43] But as societies
become technologically integrated and, more important, dependent upon technology, separating military and civilian
facilities becomes immensely more complicated, especially for morally conscientious statesmen and soldiers.
Largely owing to budgetary pressures, the United States itself can no longer afford to maintain very many high-tech
capabilities separate from those found in the civilian sector (where cutting-edge technology often first appears[44]).
Professor Dan Kuehl of the National Defense University's School of Information Warfare worries that this "growing
intermingling in the integrated information society of systems used and needed by both the military and civil sides of
society . . . is making our national information infrastructure a viable, legal, and ethical target in the case of
conflict."[45] Nowhere is this use more extensive than in the communications area.[46] The US armed forces, like
other modern militaries, rely heavily upon the civilian communications infrastructure; more than 90 percent of their
messages flow through commercial channels.[47] If that system is attacked by a belligerent intent upon cutting that
flow, what does its loss mean to noncombatants in today's society?
Attacks against communications nodes and their related computer facilities do more than just inconvenience people in

technologically advanced societies. Such systems support essential emergency services and quite often control critical
parts of the infrastructure indispensable to civilians, especially in vulnerable urban areas. Consequently, strikes against
electrical grids, designed to undermine a military's high-tech computer and communications capabilities, have
profound and often unintended ripple effects on noncombatants and their high-tech systems.[48]
Statesmen and soldiers must consider the legal and moral ramifications of using civilian systems for military purposes.
Such military use may turn them, as well as their supporting infrastructure, into a bona fide target for future opponents.
Are they thereby creating target sets whose destruction could cause undue noncombatant hardships in the United
States, and for which there is no corresponding vulnerability for adversaries from less-developed countries?
Of course, depending upon the adversary, attacks on its dual-use systems could be equally devastating to its civilian
populace. Thus, it is essential for statesmen and soldiers to avoid the misconception that "surgical" strikes using certain
high-tech methodologies (PGMs or even "bloodless" computer attacks) necessarily preclude legal and moral
complications just because the immediate casualties (including noncombatant losses) may be few.[49] James Crawford
explains:
Precision technology limits the immediate and direct harmful effects of aerial bombardment. However,
one must take issue with the assertion that the systematic destruction of the civil infrastructure through the
use of precision weapons actually reduces the harmful effects of war. Ironically, the very capability of
precision potentially augurs greater collateral casualties, not less . . . . [PGMs are] clearly an efficient and
effective application of force. . . . Unfortunately, such a methodology not only impedes the enemy in some
respects, but it also eliminates civilian life-support systems.[50]
Attacks on dual-use systems need not, however, be foregone. Rather, what is needed is a firm grasp of the long-term,
indirect effects upon noncombatants prior to the authorization of an attack. Clearly, an enhanced intelligence
architecture is necessary to provide the right kind of data to conduct the more probing proportionality calculation these
new technologies require.[51]
One way of analyzing the data that an enhanced intelligence system might provide would be to employ the new
modeling and simulation techniques now becoming available. For example, using data drawn from the Joint Resource
Assessment Data Base, US Strategic Command's Strategic War Planning System can project the expected numbers of
killed and injured when a given nuclear weapon is delivered by a designated platform in a certain fashion on a selected
target.[52] Similar systems could be developed to analyze the effects of conventional attacks on high-tech networks.
However, modeling and simulation themselves present significant recomplications for statesmen and soldiers.
Specifically, are leaders legally or morally obliged to follow the model? Suppose, for example, that a decisionmaker
chooses a course of action that the model shows will result in more numerous noncombatant casualties than another
available option. Since the legal and moral duty is to "take all feasible precautions" to avoid noncombatant
casualties,[53] if a computer calculates that a certain method of attack among several options minimizes noncombatant
losses, does that automatically preclude consideration of the other options? If a commander selects another option, has
he failed to do everything "feasible" to avoid noncombatant losses? How will a commander justify a decision that
seems to fly in the face of dispassionate computer logic? Consider that casualty estimates from whatever source can
create real quandaries for commanders at a later time. In the recent controversy over the decision to use the atomic
bomb on Japan to end World War II, the relatively crude casualty estimates of nearly 50 years ago were relied upon by
some to assert that an invasion would have cost fewer lives than the atomic attack.[54]
What the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki did do, however, was to evaporate what was left of the
Japanese government's will to resist. The object in war is to break the enemy and to impose our will. That is best
accomplished with a combination of psychological and physical shock. The dropping of two atomic bombs in August
1945 seems to have accomplished that objective.
As technology progresses, one might fairly expect the fidelity of the models to improve,[55] but it is not yet clear that
they can ever substitute for the judgment of the commander in the performance of the warfighting art. The linear,
mathematical nature of computer processes may never be able to replicate the nonlinear and often unquantifiable logic

of war.[56] The history of human conflict is littered with examples of how military forces achieved results that no
algorithm would have predicted.[57] Still, in a world that increasingly considers reports provided by an electronic
brain to be intrinsically more authoritative than human-derived analyses, it may well behoove decisionmakers in future
conflicts to somehow capture the essence of their rationale when they select a computer-produced option that on its
face seems to be more casualty-intensive than another course of action assessed by the same source.
Paralleling the problematic commingling of military and civilian high-tech facilities is the infusion of civilians into
formerly military jobs. In the past few years there has been a determined effort to convert as many military billets as
possible to less-expensive civilian positions.[58] For much the same reason, other efforts have aimed at privatizing and
outsourcing many functions traditionally performed by uniformed personnel. These initiatives have resulted in
thousands of civilians filling what were once military assignments at stateside bases and, increasingly, on foreign
deployments.[59]
While these actions are principally motivated by a desire to save scarce defense dollars, they are also a tacit
recognition that the growing sophistication of the technologies of war require the military to tap ever more frequently
civilian expertise. Armed Forces Journal reports, for example, that in fiscal year 1997, 70 percent of the Department of
Defense's information technology transactions were outsourced to private vendors.[60]
This trend heightens the long-recognized danger that new technology requiring ever-greater civilian involvement will
cloud a principle vital to the law of armed conflict: the requirement to distinguish between combatants who could be
legitimately attacked, and noncombatants who could not.[61] As with civilian objects, current international law
requires belligerents to exercise "care to separate individual civilians and the civilian population as such from the
vicinity of military objectives."[62]
International law does recognize that civilian technicians and contractors are necessary for modern militaries, but it
holds that they are subject to attack only when actually performing tasks in support of the armed forces. Unlike
uniformed personnel, they would not ordinarily be targeted when they are away from their jobs. If captured, they are
entitled to treatment as prisoners of war.[63] Nonetheless, the law has always held that noncombatants' "immunity
from damage and harm was predicated upon their obligation to abstain from hostile acts. If they took action against a
party's armed forces, they automatically lost immunity."[64]
Unfortunately, that appears to be exactly the direction in which we are heading. Defense News characterized the large
numbers of civilian technicians required for the Army's digitized battlefield as "surrogate warriors."[65] Indeed, the
operation of high-technology systems is moving civilian technicians and contractors from traditional support functions
to what are arguably "hostile" activities. For example, a civilian technician who helps execute a computerized
offensive information attack against an enemy system may well have gone beyond mere "support."
Likewise, the Air Force, probably unaware of the implications of its statement, has openly announced its intention to
use civilians operationally. In Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, the service states that
"combat operations in the 21st century" will broaden "the definition of the future operator." It goes on to say, "In the
future, any military or civilian member who is experienced in the employment and doctrine of air and space power will
be considered an operator."[66]
Once civilian technicians or contractors become involved as "operators" in "combat operations," they risk being
characterized as "unlawful combatants" under international law.[67] This has a number of consequences, including the
possibility that if captured they can be tried and punished for their hostile acts, including actions for which a
uniformed combatant would be immune.[68] It is doubtful that many of these "surrogate warriors" are cognizant of
their new status or comprehend the ramifications of it.
Since it is unlikely that military dependence on civilian expertise will diminish any time soon, several writers suggest
establishing a new type of part-time military.[69] It would be composed of engineers, information specialists, and
other technical experts who could be called into military service when necessary. Endowing civilians with military
status would support their recognition as lawful combatants under international law, and would also be a step toward
solving another problem with civilianizing military functions: the fact that civilians cannot be compelled to stay on the
job in times of crisis.[70] Only those subject to military discipline have a legal or moral responsibility to remain at

their posts.
While this approach would solve one technology-driven problem, it would create a recomplication for statesmen and
soldiers. Specifically, these proposals differ from ordinary Guard and Reserve membership in that the military
affiliation contemplated would not require the technical experts to undergo all the rigors of military training.[71] In
describing such an organization composed of information specialists, Brigadier General Bruce Lawlor, ARNG, argues
that the well-paid "innovators, intellectuals, and highly-skilled technicians" most needed would "not likely be
impressed by the opportunity to wear hair `high and tight' or do pushups and two-mile runs." Accordingly, he
recommends that "much of the military regimen" be discarded.[72]
Soldiers and statesmen need to be cautious, however, about abandoning "much of the military regimen" simply to
indulge the predilections of civilian technical experts. Military personnel are not just people in uniforms. They are
instead, as Stephen Crane, the author of Red Badge of Courage, put it, "a mysterious fraternity born out of smoke and
the danger of death."[73] In Richard Holmes' book, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle, he explains:
However much sociologists might argue that we live in an age of "narrowing skill differentials," where
many of the soldier's tasks are growing ever closer to those of his civilian contemporaries, it is an
inescapable fact that the soldier's primary function, the use--or threatened use--of force, sets him apart
from civilians. . . . [T]he fact remains that someone who joins an army is both crossing a well-defined
border within the fabric of society, and becoming a member of an organization which, in the last analysis,
may require him to kill or be killed.[74]
Importantly, Holmes argues that much of the military's regimen (even including such things as haircuts) has
psychological importance beyond its obvious practical value. Many military requirements and rituals serve to
acculturate an individual to the armed forces and to build the kind of unit cohesion and esprit de corps necessary for
participants to endure the enormous pressures of combat. For statesmen and soldiers concerned about the ethical
conduct of war, such a transformation also helps to create a selfless, morally conscious combatant.
The uncertainties and unpredictable dynamics of 21st-century battlefields make it unwise to assume that technical
experts will always be in situations that render unnecessary the kind of bonding and mental preparation that has
sustained winning military organizations for centuries. Notwithstanding the need to secure sufficient numbers of
technical experts, statesmen and soldiers must be especially wary of any actions that might erode the altruistic warrior
ethos that underpins instinctively proper behavior in the crucible of war.
Civilianizing uniformed positions is not the only way the US defense establishment hopes to deal with tight budgets.
Innovative applications of technology are also expected to help control costs. But cost is a two-edged sword in the
context of the RMA. While computers and other information technologies often produce economies, the price of many
new weapons is still quite high. PGMs, for example, are significantly more expensive than unguided dumb bombs.[75]
This fact produces a new question for statesmen and soldiers: to what extent must a nation's people sacrifice in order
to acquire systems to protect enemy civilians? If a relatively inexpensive artillery barrage can neutralize an enemy
force notwithstanding a few noncombatant casualties, is the commander obliged to employ a costly bevy of PGMs to
reduce that number to zero? It could be argued that simply having PGMs mandates their use under the theory that the
commander has an available alternative that can save noncombatant lives. The accepted view, however, holds that
there is no obligation per se to use PGMs so long as the tenets of the law of armed conflict are observed. The
commander can properly consider the price of the weapons as a factor in deciding the means of attack.[76]
For statesmen and soldiers, however, there is the further question of expectations raised by Gulf War videos of PGMs.
Undoubtedly, the perception that PGM use avoids virtually all collateral losses is something that could create a new
precept in the court of world opinion. A paradigm might arise which posits that if the United States wishes to do so, it
can employ force via PGMs in any circumstance with few or no noncombatant casualties.[77]
It is the converse that statesmen and soldiers may find most vexing, that is, the perception that failure to use PGMs
represents a considered American decision to cause noncombatant deaths. If this perception comes to represent the
consensus of world opinion, it is not inconceivable that international law may someday require PGM use (as well as

other high-tech instrumentalities) by those nations with the resources to produce or acquire them.[78] At first blush
such a development would appear to be morally and ethically attractive, but consider that even for wealthy nations like
the United States national budgets are zero-sum games. For each dollar spent to acquire an expensive PGM, one less
dollar is available for other desirable social purposes. President Dwight Eisenhower articulated this dilemma in 1953:
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in the final sense a theft from
those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not
spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, and the hopes of
its children.[79]
This raises an intriguing question: To what extent is the civilian populace of an aggressive belligerent entitled to draw
against the treasure of a law-abiding defender?[80] How many of the defender's own expectant mothers should be
denied, for example, prenatal care in order to make resources available to procure PGMs so that collateral civilian
casualties in the aggressor state are minimized? In analyzing this question one may wish to ponder historian Daniel
Boorstin's contention that Americans suffer from the "Myth of Popular Innocence," that is, the tendency to demonize
enemy leaders but absolve adversary populations of responsibility in war. Americans often assume that enemy
societies are helpless victims of powerful tyrants--despite evidence, as Boorstin views it, that "that ruthless rulers can
be removed by popular will."[81]
Even if one chooses to excuse the populations of totalitarian states, technology may yet recomplicate moral judgments
by the polities of democratic states. Proponents insist that the phenomenal growth of the Internet and other
communication technologies has helped stimulate the rise of democracies around the world. A September 1997 article
in the New York Times Magazine credits modern communication technologies with spurring the growth of democracy
and forcing totalitarian regimes to wither.[82] Another author, analyzing the nature of advanced communication
capabilities, maintains that high technology and totalitarian governments are oxymorons.[83] Thus, if revolutionary
communication systems produce democracies as the enthusiasts contend, then we are on the verge of a new era of
techno-peace since conventional wisdom holds that "democracies don't fight democracies."[84]
Regrettably, however, new studies are eroding the "democratic peace" thesis.[85] In truth, the notion that democracies
may indeed fight democracies should not really be surprising given the growing evidence of war's cultural basis.[86]
According to Samuel Huntington, future conflicts may well arise not from nations in the grip of a depraved leader (as
Americans are wont to believe) but rather from clashes between civilizations whose basic values are fundamentally at
odds.[87] Bosnia presents a manifestation of Huntington's hypothesis. Henry Kissinger argues that it was a
misconception that the removal of a few "evil bigots" there would create unity and peace in a society where deepseated ethnic hatreds pervade the populations.[88] Quite obviously, Americans must learn to accept that whole
societies may freely choose to embark upon courses of action that lead to war.[89]
Still, international law has never sought necessarily to equate noncombatant status with moral innocence. But should
the sentient, adult population in a democracy escape responsibility for their nation's actions in an era when science is
globalizing weapons of mass destruction? James Child contends, for example, in Nuclear War: The Moral Dimension
that "people have a duty to restrain their government from committing nuclear aggression, and if they fail in that duty,
their absolute immunity as noncombatants is undermined."[90] Even the US Declaration of Independence asserts the
Lockean concept that people have a duty "to alter or abolish" their government when it fails to serve "life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness."[91] Though beyond the scope of this article, it may be appropriate for statesmen and soldiers
to reexamine the question of the culpability of democratic societies engaged in high-tech conflict. Such an
examination could indicate that, where democratic states are concerned, a modification of the current understanding of
noncombatant immunity might be in order, especially when such states engage in unlawful acts such as the wrongful
use of a weapon of mass destruction.
Information Operations
The idea that democratic societies might properly be held accountable for the unlawful actions of their governments
raises the broader question as to whether democracies ought to be exempted from certain kinds of information
operations that aim to corrupt the democratic process. Powerful information and cyberwar technologies are becoming

available that can radically affect an electorate's perceptions of its leaders. Thomas Czerwinski, then a professor at the
School of Information Warfare of the National Defense University, suggested how such technologies might be used
with this rhetorical question: "What would happen if you took Saddam Hussein's image, altered it, and projected it
back to Iraq showing him voicing doubts about his own Baath Party?"[92] Quite obviously, the technology implicit in
Czerwinski's proposition could just as easily be applied against a democratically elected leader.
Moreover, the capability is hardly science fiction. As anyone who has seen the film Forrest Gump can attest,
technology now permits the creation of extraordinarily convincing but false images.[93] Of course, propaganda aimed
at enemy populations has long been considered a legitimate method of warfare. But this norm may need reexamination
when the government affected is a democratic one. It needs to be reconciled with a key component of US national
security policy: the promotion of democracy.[94] While no one would dispute that the improper <M>actions<D> of
the leaders of any enemy state--including those of democracies--must be neutralized, it is something altogether
different to hold that it is an appropriate strategy to attempt to change democratically elected leadership via the
dissemination of manipulated information.[95]
Furthermore, Michael Walzer asserts that "war aims legitimately reach to the destruction or defeat, demobilization, and
(partial) disarming of the aggressor's armed forces. Except in extreme cases, like that of Nazi Germany, they don't
legitimately reach to the transformation of the internal politics of the aggressor state or the replacement of its
regime."[96] Surely, no democratic government would be the kind of extreme case that Walzer exempts. Thus, leaders
may wish to develop policies that restrain information warriors from engaging in tactics that damage the democratic
process of the enemy state. Democracy has an intrinsic human value even when it produces governments whose
actions lead to war.
The interplay of democratic values and modern technology presents other recomplications for statesmen and soldiers.
Specifically, JV 2010 insists that the US military must have "information superiority" in future conflicts. To do so
requires not simply controlling the adversary's information sources, but also the avalanche of data available from third
parties, including the global media. This latter source would be extremely difficult to dominate.[97] With the latest
technology freeing the press from reliance on--and control by--belligerent governments,[98] it is unlikely that any
major aspect of future military operations will escape near-instantaneous reporting by international news agencies. In a
very real sense, global news sources could become the poor man's intelligence service.
In addition, information about current operations will be obtainable from other sources for a modest investment.
Already commercial satellites are providing high-resolution images heretofore the exclusive province of the
intelligence agencies of the developed nations.[99] Another information source, the Internet, is now being described as
a "simple, low-cost, non-threatening and relatively risk-free" way of collecting data valuable to intelligence
agencies.[100] All of this makes a strategy of information superiority questionable.
Thus, the capabilities of new technology present statesmen and soldiers with several unattractive options. If
information superiority is truly imperative, achieving it may require aggressive, draconian measures against
international information sources that are not parties to the conflict. Such measures are of doubtful legal and moral
validity, and they could have the unintended consequence of antagonizing allies and even bringing the United States
into conflict with third parties.[101] Another approach might be to develop means that discriminate--that deny the
transmission of internationally produced information only to an adversary. Given the number and variety of sources,
however, it would not seem practical or even possible to do so. Finally, we could change our approach, that is, develop
doctrine and strategies for conducting military operations in an environment of information transparency or
information parity. It seems that this last alternative, which obviates interference with information produced by entities
not otherwise involved in the particular conflict, would most readily mesh with our legal and moral norms.
Space
As already implied, any discussion of information operations necessarily brings up the issue of space. Satellites provide
critical surveillance and communication support for US forces, as well as for those of potential adversaries. According
to Air Force General Charles Horner, space systems are "fundamental to modern warfare."[102] For example, PGMs,
the weapons that so many hope will produce more humane warfare, often require satellite-derived information for

guidance.[103] Because of the importance of space to high-tech operations, American military leaders believe that war
in space is inevitable.[104] Accordingly, several preparatory steps have been taken, including testing laser weapons
against satellites.[105]
However, space warfare presents significant moral recomplications for senior leaders. Most fundamentally, there is the
question as to whether combat operations ought to be conducted there at all. In fact, the nature of space systems creates
legal and ethical reasons that weigh against doing so. As previously discussed, a basic principle of the law of armed
conflict is the obligation of belligerents to separate military targets from civilian objects.[106] Since the beginning of
space exploration, however, military and civilian developments commingled to a such a degree that "the separation of
military from civilian . . . space technology [is] meaningless."[107] While there are some purely military systems
today, the United States itself relies heavily on civilian satellites, many of which are owned by international
consortiums.[108]
Future opponents will likewise depend upon commercial communication and surveillance systems.[109] As a result,
space presents the classic legal and moral conundrum of multi-user systems: how do you attack them without causing
disproportionate injury to noncombatants and their property, especially when the same system is used by nations not
involved in the conflict? As a practical matter, it is difficult to foresee many scenarios where a proportionality
analysis[110] would justify attacks on multi-user systems. This is especially true as noncombatants in a growing
number of countries become ever more reliant on space-based technologies for a whole range of essential
communications and other services.
Nonetheless, US Space Command is seeking to have "space" declared its area of operations so as to facilitate planning
for conflict there.[111] Little international appetite exists for the notion of militarizing space, however. Virtually every
treaty related to space asserts that it is to be used only for "peaceful purposes."[112] (The United States interprets these
provisions to prohibit only aggressive military actions.[113]) Is it wise, therefore, for the United States to take actions-such as declaring space an area of operations for one of its combatant commands--which suggest that space is simply
another field of battle?[114] Should statesmen and soldiers advocate a course of action that might stimulate a space
arms race, akin to the nuclear arms race, as many fear?[115]
It may be shrewder to pursue a legal regime that declares space a "sanctuary" similar to that afforded communications
facilities located in neutral territory.[116] This would permit any nation to use space for communications, surveillance,
and comparable activities--even during armed conflicts--with the systems being immune to attack. Arguably, this
strategy would renew the original US policy toward space. President Eisenhower established a "self-imposed space
sanctuary policy . . . [in order to] establish the principle of freedom of space, to protect US satellites from interference,
and to avoid an arms race in space."[117] "Neutralizing" space would not appear to degrade America's warfighting
capability if US space systems were therefore protected; in any event, existing legal and policy norms already limit or
preclude attack on the multi-user international systems that adversaries will rely upon during war.
This proposal would not preclude sub-space means that selectively deny adversaries' military forces the use of signals
from space platforms. The development of lasers and other space weapons would be prohibited, although passive
defensive measures (hardening, stealth, etc.) would be allowed. Accordingly, the proposal would not be inconsistent
with current US space policy, which advocates diplomatic and legal "measures to preclude an adversary's hostile use
of space systems and services."[118] Some may argue that the movement of weaponry into space is inevitable and
cannot be effectively banned.[119] But the remarkable history of nuclear arms control (during which many of the same
arguments were made) leaves room for optimism--especially if action is taken soon.
Threshold of Conflict
Another recomplicating effect of the new technologies is the danger that they may inadvertently lead to a lowering of
the threshold of violent conflict. Peacetime information operations are one example of how this might occur. Consider,
for instance, that there is no clearly accepted definition of what kind of data manipulation constitutes "aggression" and
is thus contrary to international law and condemned by the UN Charter.[120] Current interpretations of "aggression"
were largely built upon notions of "armed attack" committed by aggressors employing traditional kinetic-effect
weapons.[121] While legal definitions of "armed attack" may seem to allow peacetime data manipulations so long as

bombs or bullets are not used,[122] the recipient country, not sharing such a pacific interpretation, may react violently
and thus kick off a cycle of escalation unintended by the initiating infowarriors.
The growing proliferation of the popular new nonlethal technologies presents similar recomplications.[123] Part of the
recomplication results from misunderstanding the terminology. The characterization of these capabilities as
"nonlethal," for example, is a source of real confusion--virtually all of them are potentially deadly.[124] Moreover,
certain of them also clash with existing treaties such as those that limit or prohibit the use of chemical and biological
agents.[125] Consequently, while items like rubber bullets, sticky foam, and so forth do have the potential to lower the
risk of casualties in particular situations, there is the danger that decisionmakers will be seduced by the same
misconception discussed previously in this essay, that is, the flawed notion that military operations can be conducted
without risk to soldiers or civilians.[126]
All of this is especially worrisome because of the unpredictability of the reaction of those against whom supposedly
nonlethal means are used. To reiterate a central theme of this essay: what was intended as a "bloodless" means of
coercion may well generate a lethal response. It would seem prudent then for statesmen and soldiers to view
information operations and nonlethal technologies principally as means to minimize noncombatant casualties under
circumstances where the use of force is otherwise necessary and appropriate. If this is clearly understood,
miscalculation is averted, and the unintended involvement in unexpectedly hostile situations is checked.[127]
It is worth noting that a similar issue exists with regard to other high-tech systems. Indeed, the post-Gulf War uses of
PGMs against Iraq raise the issue. Quite often the declared purpose is to "send a message" to that government, a
function traditionally the role of a diplomatic bag. Analysts A. J. Bacevich and Lawrence Kaplan ask, "Given the
precision weapons that the United States advertises as central to the new American military doctrine, how many people
is it permissible to kill merely to send a message?"[128]
It is true that manipulating the psychology of an adversary could constitute a legitimate military objective.[129] The
difficulty, as Geoffrey Best notes, is quantifying the often subjective estimates of psychological effects in terms
rational enough to support a meaningful finding of the "definite military advantage" that the law requires to warrant the
use of force.[130] How does one definitively assess, for example, the psychological effect of an incremental use of
force on persons of another culture?[131] Absent the supporting data, the use of force for psychological purposes may
be difficult to justify. The real issue for statesmen and soldiers is ensuring that the casualty-minimizing features of
high-tech weaponry do not induce decisionmakers to inappropriately lower the threshold for the use of force. Bacevich
and Kaplan warn:
Ultimately, a doctrine that relies on antiseptic methods of warfare may prove dangerously seductive.
Seemingly tailor-made for an era of post-modern politics, precision weapons also have the potential to
increase the propensity of political leaders to resort to violent means. The ready availability of [PGMs]
may tempt them to conclude that force need no longer remain the option of last resort, and induce them to
employ their arsenal without due reflection.[132]
Organizational Culture
High technology also carries potential unexpected consequences for the organizational cultures of militaries on 21stcentury battlefields. Communications advances will be the most important agent of organizational change. As JV 2010
indicates, technology is already becoming available that will provide individual soldiers with unprecedented access to
all kinds of information.[133] Such technology will facilitate the elimination of various levels of command and
supervision, resulting in a "flattening" of traditionally hierarchical military organizations. Other technology-fathered
changes will directly affect battlefield tactics. The Marine Corps, for example, is experimenting with a new tactic
called "infestation" which capitalizes on the new technologies.[134] The technique relies on advanced communication
systems to coordinate large numbers of small infantry teams assaulting the same objective.
While increased combat effectiveness should result from these and other technology-driven organizational changes,
there are nevertheless potential "revenge effects" of concern to statesmen and soldiers. In his book The Unintended
Consequences of Information Age Technologies, David Alberts warns that when subordinates are provided with the
"larger picture" that new data-transfer capabilities allow, they are "likely to second-guess decisions made at higher

levels and . . . have the information required to undertake initiatives their superiors may find inappropriate."[135]
It seems therefore that, ironically, controlling the actions of lower-echelon troops may not necessarily be enhanced by
better communications technologies. Regrettably, it is at those levels that the risk of indiscipline is the greatest--the My
Lai massacre during the Vietnam War being just one example.[136] Sadly, atrocities seem to be an enduring feature of
war. Stephen Ambrose notes,
When you put young people, 18, 19, or 20 years old, in a foreign country with weapons in their hands,
sometimes terrible things happen that you wish never happened. This is a reality that stretches across time
and across continents. It is a universal aspect of war, from the time of the ancient Greeks up to the
present.[137]
What is worrisome about 21st-century battlefield technology is that it will put ready access to vastly more potent
firepower into the hands of the young troops that Ambrose describes. The new battlefield organization produced by
infestation tactics is illustrative. Analysts assert that the "most revolutionary aspect" of the new concept is that the
infantryman does not rely on his personal weapon to engage the enemy, but will instead call in outside fire support. In
short, the experts say, "Rather than a `shooter,' the infantryman becomes a `spotter.'" They further observe:
This change of identity for the infantryman stems from technological advances. With enhanced digital
communications, more accurate smart munitions, and manportable guidance systems, fire support . . . is the
king of the battlefield. In addition to traditional tube artillery, the individual team can call for and direct
close air support, rocket fires, naval gunfire, and missile attacks.[138]
Quite obviously, whatever havoc troops were able to wreak with their personal weapons at places like My Lai, that
terrible potential will be markedly greater in future conflicts because of the new technologies of war, particularly since
the command and supervisory structure that might intervene is, by design, less robust.
By empowering junior personnel, the new technologies of war create other recomplications as well. Aviation Week &
Space Technology reports that senior American officials are concerned about the effect of the absence of clear rules
concerning information operations. They believe that "once soldiers and airmen start dying in a war, the young
computer-literate officers and enlisted men are going to start making their own efforts to crack enemy computer
systems."[139] Free-lance efforts of this sort can create serious problems. For example, a computer virus loosed on an
enemy might have "unintended consequences and come back and cripple friendly computers."[140] The adverse ripple
effects of such actions on noncombatants may be quite significant.
Still, the solution is not to deny lower echelons the benefits of the technology. Rather, when technology dramatically
empowers junior personnel, steps must be taken to ensure that they are fully prepared, both technically and
psychologically, to handle the greater legal and moral responsibilities that the enhanced capabilities impose upon them.
Unquestionably, maintaining discipline and professionalism under the new combat conditions is more essential than
ever--yet ever more difficult to guarantee.
Another recomplicating effect is caused by the proliferating e-mail-equipped laptop computers, fax machines, cellular
phones, and similar technologies that troops themselves own and carry with them into war zones.[141] What is more,
according to former Congressman Newt Gingrich, "Virtually every soldier in combat in 2010 will have somewhere on
their body a personal telephone linked by satellite to a world telephone network."[142] Such devices raise a number of
complications, not the least of which is that they are extremely vulnerable to monitoring by hostile forces.[143]
Equally important is that these devices hasten the day when the authority of the military commander could be
questioned on the battlefield, a development with potentially disastrous consequences. The prospect of instant
communications by soldiers of future battlefields causes Nicholas Wade to ask, "Would any commander want his
soldiers to receive parental advice in the midst of a firefight? What if Dad disagrees with the officer on the scene? As
Napoleon said, `One bad general is better than two good ones.'"[144] Similarly, Newsweek inquired over six years ago,
"If soldiers can phone mom or the local newspaper from the middle of the battlefield, what are the implications for
maintaining military discipline or secrecy?"[145]

To deal with such concerns some commanders will attempt to restrict the use of these communications devices. But is
this realistic? Can a democracy reliant on an all-volunteer force expect to isolate forward-deployed troops from contact
with their friends and families, especially when they have grown up in an environment of instant communications
gratification? It may be more practical, as suggested previously, to abandon the goal of information security and plan
accordingly.
Finally, the assimilation of these revolutionary technologies into the armed services might create a generation of
"console warriors" who wage war without ever confronting the deadly consequences of their actions. Statesmen and
soldiers should not assume that such combatants will automatically share the military's traditional values that restrain
illegal and immoral conduct in war. Until now, much of the military's ethos was drawn from concepts of honor and
chivalry sourced in the physical reality of direct combat. Although the extent to which the proliferation of longdistance, push-button war serves to replace that ethos with a new ethic is as yet uncertain, it is imperative that
whatever emerges instills in tomorrow's soldiers those moral underpinnings which will further develop the application
of ethical and legal norms in future conflicts.
Summary and Conclusions
At this point, the reader may agree that my promise at the beginning of this essay has been fulfilled: far more questions
have been raised than solutions offered. It seems clear that despite their many beneficial aspects, the emerging RMA
technologies have great capacity for unintended consequences and revenge effects. Our examination reveals several
broad themes that statesmen and soldiers may wish to address:

. The unpredictability of an adversary's response to high-tech attack. While US intent in using PGMs or other hightech means in a particular conflict might be to minimize casualties on both sides, their use may, nevertheless, drive an
enemy incapable of responding in kind to resort to measures that could make war, paradoxically, more destructive or
inhumane than if the high-tech weapons had not been used at all.

. The increasing commingling of military and civilian high-tech systems. Although this dual- and multi-use trend is
unlikely to change in the future, greater consideration should be given to the moral and legal implications of making
legitimate targets out of systems upon which technology-dependent societies rely. Where possible, steps should be
taken to ensure that essential services are preserved in the event of war. At a minimum, decision-support systems need
to be developed not only to analyze the vulnerability of friendly populations but also to assess high-tech targets in
hostile countries in order to assist military commanders in making an informed proportionality judgment. Such systems
need to be able to evaluate secondary and third-order effects on civilian populations.

. The blurring of the distinction between noncombatant civilians and combatant military personnel. Technologies,
along with budget-driven decisions to outsource, privatize, and otherwise civilianize military functions have moral and
legal ramifications. Care must be taken to ensure that a whole class of unlawful combatants is not inadvertently
created. There may be utility in devising new kinds of reserve organizations for technologically skilled personnel
which do not require members to conform to all the rigors of a professional military. However, such efforts must not
compromise those aspects of the military regimen that develop the military's altruistic warrior ethos which underpins
moral conduct in war.

. Information operations. Information operations and cyberwar can complicate the moral life for senior leaders in
many ways, but of particular concern are the new techniques that can interfere with democratic societies. Information
operations and cyberwar techniques are properly applied to control the aggressive behavior of nations, but they should
not be permitted to destroy democratic values in the process. Moreover, the proliferation of third-party
communications sources renders suspect military strategies aimed at achieving information superiority.

. The militarization of space. Satellites and space vehicles are irrevocably integrated into modern warfare. However,
this does not mean that space should become another battlefield. Rather, the United States should use its prestige as the

preeminent space power to forge an international consensus that designates space to be a neutral area, thereby possibly
avoiding a space weapons race.

. The lowering of the threshold of conflict. Advanced technology provides the capability to employ coercion via nonor low-lethal means in a way that greatly minimizes the immediate noncombatant losses. Because of the
unpredictability of the response of those targeted, however, care must be taken to ensure that misunderstanding of the
nature and implications of military means do not delude decisionmakers with visions of "bloodlessly" coercing
opponents by means short of violent conflict. Absent such caution we risk taking actions with the dangerous potential
to spin out of control into full-scale war.

. Organizational culture. Vastly enhanced communications capabilities that shift more and more battlefield
responsibilities to lower levels of command must be accompanied by appropriate training to ensure that legal and
moral norms of the law of war are observed by technology-empowered junior personnel.
These are by no means all the high-technology issues with potential to recomplicate moral life for 21st-century
statesmen and soldiers. Of course, it would be a mistake to conclude that the problems discussed above somehow
warrant a retreat from infusing RMA technology into defense planning. After all, high-tech weapons ordinarily do have
their intended effect--and sometimes that is the unexpected consequence. For example, military historian Martin van
Creveld observes that, ironically, "in every region where [nuclear weapons] have been introduced, large-scale,
interstate war has as good as disappeared."[146] In short, however horrific their potential, nuclear weapons have
successfully performed the deterrent function that creators hoped they would, to the surprise of a myriad of naysayers.
To many it is perhaps the ultimate unexpected--though not unintended--consequence that the advent of the nuclear age
has coincided with the absence of the kind of savage global war that twice visited the world this century.
While technology can obviously deter war, it is still true that "technology and warfare have never been far apart."[147]
Clearly, statesmen and soldiers need to be concerned about procuring the technology necessary for US forces to
prevail in any conflict. Analysts Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson ominously warn that "technology has permitted
the division of mankind into ruler and ruled."[148] In that regard, even America's vaunted free-enterprise system, the
engine that fuels its technological might, has its own recomplications.
Consider that American values--in this instance the commitment to full and fair competition within a capitalistic
economy--might deny US troops the best technology on 21st-century battlefields. Author David Shukman explains:
"While the Western military struggle for a decade on average to acquire new weapons, a country with commercially
available computer equipment and less rigorous democratic and accounting processes could field new systems within
a few years. It is the stuff of military nightmares."[149] Although high-tech systems are touted as a means to get inside
an adversary's "decision loop,"[150] the reality is that nations unencumbered by Western-style procurement regulations
may well be able to get inside our "acquisition loop" and field newer weaponry even before the United States finishes
buying already obsolete equipment.
Just as the speed of technological change creates difficulties for the procurement process, so it does for those
concerned with law, ethics, and policy. President Harry Truman once remarked that he feared that "machines were
ahead of morals by some centuries." That certainly is the case in today's RMA environment.[151] Consequently,
statesmen and soldiers must accelerate their efforts to develop norms of law, ethics, and policy that honor this nation's
finest ideals while at the same time appreciating that "technology is America's manifest destiny."[152]
This will not be an easy task. Nor is the problem without historical precedent. Russell F. Weigley notes in his 1977
classic, The American Way of War, that "to seek refuge in technology from hard questions of strategy and policy [is]
another dangerous American tendency, fostered by the pragmatic qualities of the American character and by the
complexity of nuclear-age technology."[153] Quite obviously statesmen and soldiers must recognize technology's
potential, but they must do so with the clear understanding that it will never substitute for answering the kind of hard
questions of law, ethics, and policy that will continue to recomplicate moral life on 21st-century battlefields.
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